We consider the problem of task allocation in a network of cyber-physical systems (CPSs). The network can have different states, and the tasks are of different types. The task arrival is stochastic and state-dependent. Every CPS is capable of performing each type of task with some specific state-dependent efficiency. The CPSs have to agree on task allocation prior to knowing about the realized network's state and/or the arrived tasks. We model the problem as a multistate stochastic cooperative game with state uncertainty. We then use the concept of deterministic equivalence and sequential core to solve the problem. We establish the non-emptiness of the strong sequential core in our designed task allocation game and investigate its characteristics including uniqueness and optimality. Moreover, we prove that in the task allocation game, the strong sequential core is equivalent to Walrasian equilibrium under state uncertainty; consequently, it can be implemented by using the Walras' tatonnement process.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a significant growth in research efforts on developing efficient task allocation methods that find application in a variety of real-world scenarios. An example is a network of cyber-physical systems, which is developed to perform a wide range of tasks, such as computation, transmission, measurement, and the like. While the type and the load of the jobs arrived at every CPS is often random, each CPS might favor some specific sort of tasks, as a consequence of its own characteristics and available resources.
In the presence of ubiquitous connectivity, performing the randomly-arrived tasks cooperatively can be a solution to the aforementioned preference problem; nonetheless, promoting such cooperation in a distributed manner is a challenging task, due to the selfishness of individual entities as well as the existence randomness and uncertainty.
Similar to many other resource management problems, models adapted from economic theory are widely used to address task allocation problems. In [1] , task allocation for humanmachine collaborative systems is studied using Markovian models. By modeling the human fatigue as a continuous-time Markov decision process, they show that the optimal task assignment can be solved by linear programming. Reference
The work of M. van der Schaar was supported by the NSF Award 1524417. The authors are grateful to Prof. William R. Zame for very helpful discussions. [2] investigates repeated task allocation based on prospect theory. Self-adaptive auction is the basis of task-bundle allocation in [3] . Location-dependent task allocation for crowdsourcing is considered in [4] . Reference [5] uses a mechanism design approach to address a similar problem. Pilloni et al. [6] formulate the distributed task assignment problem as a non-cooperative game. Reference [7] addresses the problem by using a model based on Stackelberg convention game model. Distributed allocation of complex tasks in social networks is considered in [8] , using both cooperative and non-cooperative models. Manisterski et al. [9] propose a centralized task allocation scheme based on cooperation among coalitions of agents. Similarly, in [10] , tasks are executed by coalitions of agents. Distributed algorithms for task allocation via coalition formation are studied also in [11] . Furthermore, [12] formulates the task allocation problem as a repeated game. Reference [13] considers the distributed resource allocation problem with cognitive users that, given the data in the network, adapt their decisions. In [14] , the authors consider an energy-harvesting wireless network. They propose a method based on exchange economy with uncertainty to allocate the task of serving users. Reference [15] discusses a series of game-theoretical models to address resource management problems in IoT networks.
The majority of the existing research works either suffer from oversimplified models due to neglecting the uncertainty or necessitate the availability of prior information and the existence of a central controller. Extending the state-of-theart, we investigate a distributed task management problem in a network of autonomous agents (such as CPSs), where the task arrival is stochastic. The tasks impose different requirements. The network' state is time-varying and a priori unknown. CPSs' capabilities are distinct and state-dependent. We model the problem as a stochastic cooperative game with state uncertainty. We reformulate the game using the concept of certainty equivalence, to deal with the random task arrival. In the equivalent deterministic game, we use the strong sequential core as a solution concept. We establish the non-emptiness of the strong sequential core, by showing that Walrasian equilibrium under state uncertainty lies inside it. We then characterize such equilibrium, including uniqueness and optimality. Finally, we use the Walrasian auction to implement the core solution. The developed analytical framework, which appears in the literature for the first time, is applicable to 978-1-5386-4727-1/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE a wide range of resource allocation problems beyond task management.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a network of N autonomous entities, each consisting of physical and computational elements. We refer to each entity as a CPS. The CPSs are gathered in a set N . The network can be in one of the S different states, modeled as the outcomes of some random variable. The CPSs engage in executing some divisible tasks of M different types, collected in a set M. This includes for instance measurement, sensing, computation, signal processing, and transmission. For S states of the network and M tasks, there exist M S state-contingent tasks.
At every state s ∈ S, each CPS n ∈ N is characterized by a performance index (or type) vector ρ
. Each element of the type vector represents the ability of CPS n ∈ N to perform a task of type m ∈ M at state s ∈ S, in the sense that larger performance index implies higher efficiency. Naturally, ρ (s) nm ∈ (0, 1] depends on a variety of factors including the quality of the available transmission channel, computational capacity, measurement precision, and the like. Every CPS is aware its own type at every possible state, but does not know the future state. In the following, we provide an intuitive example to clarify the model. Example 1. Consider two UAVs (N = 2) that perform field surveillance and transmission (M = 2). The first UAV obtains its energy via energy harvesting, whereas the second one is supplied with a battery. Both UAVs have high-quality transmission channel in good weather condition, while the transmission is prone to errors in bad weather. We define two states for nature, namely Rainy and Sunny, gathered in the set S = {R, S}. We also define two qualitative types in performing each task, namely Low and High, respectively denoted by L and H. Naturally, the types can be represented also quantitatively by using positive real numbers.
Clearly, as a result of low channel quality, none of the UAVs would perform well in transmission if it rains. Moreover, unlike the battery-powered UAV, the energy-harvesting UAV is not able to perform acceptable surveillance in the rainy weather, due to the lack of energy. Thus we conclude that ρ Note that the example can become even more general by adding more states and/or types. For example, in an environment-friendly application, one might add a type Average to describe the performance of the battery-powered UAV while taking the energy cost into account. In fact, although the aforementioned UAV is able to perform the tasks even in bad weather condition, its efficiency can be described as average since it causes high energy cost.
At state s ∈ S, every CPS n ∈ N randomly receives q (s) nm > 0 unit(s) of task m ∈ M to perform, which is a random variable that follows an exponential distribution with parameter λ (s) nm . We define q , and
for all m ∈ M. An exemplary system is depicted in Fig. 1 . We assume that CPSs are able to cooperate in performing all tasks by redistributing Q 
, where x . The total utility follows as
.
(2)
We model the network by a multi-agent system, where each CPS is a risk-averse agent. We capture the risk-aversion by an exponential utility function as
This choice of utility function guarantees that in performing every task, higher efficiency results in larger utility. Thus, in a Pareto-optimal task allocation, CPSs with better performance index tend to receive more tasks to perform, which improves the overall efficiency. Under state uncertainty, the distributed task management follows the two-stage economy model [16] , as summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Task Management under State Uncertainty
1: At t = 0, network's state is unknown. However, all agreements (commitments) among CPSs with regards to task distribution are made in this stage, i.e., under state uncertainty. This means that, at t = 0, CPSs make commitments (to form coalitions, perform a share of a task, etc.) for every possible state. n , s ∈ S, is the likelihood of occurrence of state s ∈ S, as predicted by CPS n ∈ N . The expected utility with respect to random states is given by
where
for all s ∈ S. Note that (4) includes two random variables: tasks' loads and network's state.
To formalize the cooperative task allocation, we model the CPS network with an stochastic exchange economy under state uncertainty. The model captures the procedure of exchanging tasks among CPS. In order to develop an exchange mechanism, we use virtual prices to quantify the value of each task based on its popularity over CPSs. In this virtual model, every CPS has to pay a price for every unit of each task at every state. We denote the price vector by p = [
. Based on the initial task arrivals, for every n ∈ N , the budget set yields
The CPSs are expected-utility maximizer; that is, at stage 0, every CPS n ∈ N would like to agree on
(its statedependent load of the tasks) so as to maximize its expected utility. Let X (s) n be the set of all possible demands for CPS n ∈ N . Therefore, each CPS n ∈ N solves the following optimization problem:
In what follows, we model and solve the task allocation problem using multi-state stochastic cooperative games under state uncertainty. To analyze the formulated game: (i) for every individual state, we replace the stochastic game with its deterministic equivalent; (ii) we use the expected utility and Walrasian auction model to implement the strong sequential core. The procedure is summarized in Fig. 2 . 
III. CERTAINTY EQUIVALENT OF STATE GAMES
For every state game and every CPS n ∈ N , we define the preference relation n in terms of Von Neumann-Morgenstern, where a stochastic reward is preferred to the other if it yields a larger expected utility. Formally, for the utility function u
where the expectation is taken with respect to the random tasks. Let C indicate the set of all possible coalitions among N CPSs with its cardinality being 2 N . In the task allocation problem, the initial wealth of each singleton coalition consisting of CPS n ∈ N is q (s) n , so that the initial wealth of every coalition c ∈ C is given as
n , which is stochastic. Similar to the deterministic setting, in a stochastic case, the value of each coalition is divided between coalition members. Each coalition c include N c CPSs, collected in a set N c . Moreover, the allocation profile is shown as x
A. Certainty (Deterministic) Equivalence
To join a coalition, every CPS first determines its demand, by solving the optimization problem (6) . To this end, we first eliminate the randomness in x (s) n (tasks' loads). At every state, the stochastic cooperative game is transformed to a deterministic cooperative game using the concept of certainty (deterministic) equivalence [17] . In order to transform a stochastic game to a deterministic one, for each CPS n ∈ N , we need to specify the deterministic share of the coalition value, in a way that every CPS is indifferent (in terms of (7) ) between the stochastic value x . The following proposition characterizes d n . 1 Proposition 1. Let the utility function of a CPS n ∈ N be given by (3) . The certainty equivalent of the random task share x (s) nm,c is given by
Let r (s) n,c ≥ 0 be the share of user n ∈ c of the wealth of coalition c ∈ C at state s ∈ S, so that ∑ n∈Nc r (s) n,c = 1 for all s ∈ S. By using Proposition 1, problem (6) can be transformed to its deterministic equivalent as
1 Proofs are omitted due to space limitations.
where v n,D 
After reformatting the game by using the concept of certainty equivalence, we face a multi-state deterministic cooperative game under state uncertainty. Before proceeding, in the following we discuss the effect of the transformation to the deterministic equivalent on the solution of the game. For a cooperative game with deterministic rewards, a well-known solution concept is the core [18] .
. The core, denoted by C, is a set of payoff allocations for the grand coalition [x n ] n∈N satisfying the following conditions: 
In words, in core, all the worth is allocated in a way that there is no coalition of players in which all members benefit by deviating from the grand coalition. As discussed before, in our setting, the game at every state is stochastic, which we transform to its deterministic equivalent. The following theorem states the relation between the core of a stochastic game and that of its deterministic equivalent.
Theorem 1 ( [17]
). The core of stochastic game G (s) is identical to the core of its deterministic equivalent G (s) D . By Theorem 1, replacing the stochastic state game with its deterministic equivalent does not change the core of the game. In other words, replacing the stochastic problem (6) with the deterministic one (9) only simplifies the analysis, and does not affect the solution.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MULTI-STATE GAME WITH STATE UNCERTAINTY
For single-state games, the core is the most important solution concept. However, for multi-state games with state uncertainty, the conventional core definition does not suffice, which gives rise to new solution concepts. In this paper, we focus on strong sequential core [19] .
Definition 2 (Strong Sequential Core [19] ). The strong sequential core of a multi-state game G is the set of all feasible allocationsx = for all n ∈ c.
In words, for an allocation to belong to the strong sequential core, the following must hold: (a) The allocation should belong to the core of the state game in every state s ∈ S; That is, it must be stable against all the deviations ex-post (after revealing the uncertainty). (b) No coalition of agents (including the grand coalition) shall be able to improve uponx ex-ante (before revealing the uncertainty). A coalition can improve upon an allocation x with allocation x, if x is feasible and gives each CPS of the deviating coalition a higher expected utility. Similar to the conventional core, it is necessary to characterize the strong sequential core for the designed task allocation game, for instance to establish its non-emptiness. To this end, we first introduce the Walrasian equilibrium under uncertainty. In addition, by using this equilibrium notion, we provide a distributed method to implement a core solution.
V. STRONG SEQUENTIAL CORE AND WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM UNDER UNCERTAINTY
In this section, we first define the concept of Walrasian equilibrium under state uncertainty in a multi-state exchange economy. We then characterize this solution in the task allocation game. Afterward, we establish that for the formulated multi-state task allocation game, Walrasian equilibrium under uncertainty belongs to the strong sequential core of the corresponding deterministic equivalent game with state uncertainty. By equivalency, it is also a core solution for the original stochastic game. Therefore, by implementing a Walrasian equilibrium, one achieves a solution in the strong sequential core. We also describe an implementation method.
A. Walrasian Equilibrium under Uncertainty
In an exchange economy with state uncertainty, an equilibrium notion is the Walrasian equilibrium under uncertainty, defined in the following. 
The existence and characteristics of Walrasian equilibrium depend on the CPS's utility functions and the randomness in task arrival. In the following proposition, we characterize the Walrasian equilibrium for our formulated task allocation game. Proposition 2. In our designed multi-state stochastic exchange economy, Walrasian equilibrium under state uncertainty exists. Moreover, it is unique and Pareto-efficient, thus social-optimal. Proposition 3. The Walrasian equilibrium described in Proposition 2 lies in the strong sequential core of the multi-state stochastic cooperative game with state uncertainty.
B. Implementation of Strong Sequential Core
By Proposition 3, the Walrasian equilibrium under uncertainty lies inside the strong sequential core; as a result, in order to implement a core solution, it suffices to implement the Walrasian equilibrium. One mechanism is the Walras' tatonnement process, summarized in Algorithm 2. The process is usually coordinated by an auctioneer, which, at each round, announces the prices, starting at some random initial point. Afterward, CPSs disclose their desired task loads at the given prices, and the auctioneer adjusts prices to the claimed demands. The process continues until the prices yield a sum demand equal to the total arrival, for all types of tasks. At this point, prices and demands are final, and the auction process terminates [20] . Let z (s) ( p (s) ) be the excess demand given price vector p (s) , defined by
for every m ∈ M. The price adjustment rule yields [21] 
for a sufficiently small α > 0. Clearly, for every state s, the only stationary points of this process are prices p (s) at which z (s) m (p (s) ) = 0 for all m ∈ M, i.e., equilibrium prices [21] . Note that the auction can be also implemented in a fullydistributed manner (without auctioneer), where CPSs exchange the price/demand information and locally update the prices. • Each CPS declares its demand.
•
The auctioneer observes excess demands, and adjusts the prices using (14) . 5: until Market clears. Convergence Speed-The convergence speed of the Walrasian auction depends mainly on the price adjustment factor α as well as agents' utility functions, and thus cannot be determined rigorously. However, it should be noted that α being too small slows down the convergence, whereas selecting α too large prevents the process from convergence.
Complexity-On the CPSs' side, the problem of calculating demands given the prices (budget) is a non-linear contentious knapsack problem with the number of inputs being the number of tasks M at every state. For such problem polynomial-time algorithm exists [22] . On the auctioneer side, calculating the excess demand and price adjustment is linear in the number of CPSs N .
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We consider a CPS network consisting of four CPSs (N = 4), three task types (M = 3), and three states (S = 3). The CPSs' performance indexes for carrying out tasks in different states are generated simply at random. For every CPS n ∈ N , the initial arrival of any task m ∈ M at every state s ∈ S is a random variable following an exponential distribution with parameter (rate) λ (s) nm = n. The probability distributions assigned by CPSs to states are selected randomly from the 3-dimensional probability space. The price adjustment factor is selected as α = 0.01.
First we investigate the effect of using deterministic equivalence in the analysis. We initially consider stochastic task arrival, where CPSs apply the proposed approach to agree on task allocation. In Fig. 3 , we show the ex-ante (before state resolution) and ex-post (after realization of every state) utility of each CPS n ∈ N , normalized by the aggregate utility, i.e., un ∑ n∈N un . In essence, this is the utility achieved by the task allocation resulted from using the concept of deterministic equivalence (i.e., dictated by In another experiment, we assume that the tasks arrived at every CPS are deterministic and known. We perform only the conventional auction process, and show the utility in Fig. 3 , as described before. From this figure, it can be concluded that by using the deterministic equivalence, the effect of stochastic task arrival is almost eliminated; that is, the users are indifferent between receiving the deterministic equivalent payoff or the stochastic payoff.
Moreover, in Fig. 4 , we illustrate the relation between the performance index and task allocation. As expected, a CPS with high performance index for some specific task is more likely to receive larger share of that task in the final allocation, compared to a CPS with a low performance index for that task; Naturally, this improves the overall network performance in executing the arrived tasks. Fig. 5 shows the relation between the excess demand and the price of two exemplary state-contingent tasks. It can be seen that, as expected, the excess demand reduces as the price increases. The entire agreement process ends when the market clears for all state-contingent tasks, i.e., ∑ n∈N r (s) n = 1 for all s ∈ S. The number of iterations required for the market clearing for every state-contingent task is shown in Fig. 6 . Thus the entire allocation process converges in 60 iterations. Fig. 3 . The utility resulted from deterministic equivalence allocation for the stochastic problem, compared to the deterministic game. Task-CPS   T1C1 T1C2 T1C3 T1C4 T2C1 T2C2 T2C3 T2C4 T3C1 T3C2 T3C3 T3C4   0   0.5 1
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Task -CPS   T1C1 T1C2 T1C3 T1C4 T2C1 T2C2 T2C3 T2C4 T3C1 T3C2 T3C3 Next, we show that the task allocation belongs to the strong sequential core; that is, joining the grand coalition is beneficial for every CPS n ∈ N ex-ante, and the ex-ante allocation lies in the core of the ex-post games. Since the efficiency prerequisite is satisfied by the market clearing condition (every task is allocated in full), we only need to check the coalitional deviations prerequisites. This means that there should be no coalition in which at least one member is better off leaving the grand coalition while all other members remain indifferent.
To perform the experiment, we first simulate some task arrival according to the described exponential distribution. In Figs. 7(a)-7(d), we illustrate the maximum ex-ante and ex-post achievable reward of every CPS at every possible coalition, including the grand coalition. For each CPS, all values are normalized by its utility resulted from our proposed task allocation scheme, i.e., as dictated by The values which do not appear in the diagrams are less than 95% of the reward of grand coalition, and therefore cannot be observed. Fig. 7(a) shows the normalized expected utility of every CPS ex-ante. It can be observed that for the grand coalition, the ratio is always equal to one. This means that our allocation scheme achieves the best performance, despite being performed prior to the actual job arrival. Moreover, there is no coalitional deviation (including singleton coalitions) in which at least one member benefits, while other members remain indifferent. Thus the allocation is stable. In Figs. 7(b), 7(c), and 7(d), we assume that state 1, state 2, and state 3 are realized, respectively. The normalized utility for the ex-post games are then depicted. The figures show that the grand coalition is also ex-post stable, i.e., no coalition of CPSs benefits from a deviation even after the realized state is revealed. Together with the efficiency condition, we can conclude that the allocation dictated by [ r (s) n ] n∈N ,s∈S cannot be improved upon by any other allocation ex-ante and also ex-post. Therefore it lies in the strong sequential core.
VII. CONCLUSION
We considered a task allocation problem in a network of CPSs with state-dependent capability and random task arrivals. We formulated the problem as a multi-state stochastic cooperative game with state uncertainty, and analyzed the game using the concepts of deterministic equivalence and strong sequential core. Finally, we characterized an efficient core solution and provided an approach to implement it. 
